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International Accounting Standard No. 24 (IAS 24) (article 9) defines a related party as "a person 
or entity that is related to the entity that is preparing its financial statements". The same article 
also defines an RPT as "a transfer of resources, services, or obligations between related parties, 
regardless of whether a price is charged" (International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), 
2009). Kang et al. (2014, p. 273) define RPTs as "transactions with related entities such as 
shareholders, members of boards of directors, and affiliated companies". Huang and Liu (2010) 
mention members of boards and top executive managers, in addition to their close family 
relatives, as potential parties with which RPTs can occur. Transactions with political connections 
can also be considered RPTs (Habib et al., 2017a; Habib et al., 2017b). The issue of concern in 
RPTs is that with the nature of the relations between these parties and the companies involved, in 
many cases RPTs are not normal transactions, and may be therefore used illegitimately to benefit 
some parties at the expense of other parties. 
 
             RPTs have been used in business for a long time. Doing business with related parties 
may be beneficial to a company through facilitating business transactions and lowering their cost 
(Srinivasan, 2013; Di Carlo, 2014), in addition to improving monitoring of these transactions 
(Utama & Utama, 2014). However, the vast majority of literature on RPTs highlights significant 
concern about the possibilities of dominant shareholders misusing RPTs to shift funds out of the 
business to increase their own wealth, at the expense of other shareholders and stakeholders 
(Utama & Utama, 2009; Williams & Taylor, 2013; Di Carlo, 2014; Kang et al., 2014; Habib et 
al., 2017a). In addition, dominant shareholders who also act as top executive managers in a 
company may use RPTs for creating intentional misstatements in the financial statements of the 
company, in order to deceive users of these financial statements and benefit at their expense, 
making the presence of RPTs a fraud risk factor (Arens et al., 2017). 
 
While the negative use of RPTs has been witnessed worldwide, it is likely to have more 
negative effects in developing countries, where weak corporate governance and limited financial 
reporting transparency (Li et al., 2014) is coupled with limited protection of the rights of smaller 
shareholders (Williams & Taylor, 2013), leading to a higher likelihood of abusing RPTs by 
dominant shareholders. Given this, regulatory authorities in developing countries should pay 
attention to the degree of prevalence of RPTs in business practice. One way of doing so is to 
identify the determinants of RPTs in such countries, in order to enhance monitoring of 
companies more likely to engage in negative RPTs, and enact regulations to limit such practice 
when deemed desirable.   
 
Jordan, the context of this study, is a MENA region country where the closely-held 
business model with limited owner/manager separation is common, and corporate governance 
concerns are reported (Abdullatif & Al-Khadash, 2010; Solomon, 2010; Shanikat & Abbadi, 
2011; Haddad et al., 2015; Abdullatif & Kawuq, 2015; Abdullatif; 2016; Almarayeh, 2018). 
Such a closely-held business model is expected to lead to prevalence of different types of RPTs, 
especially those with negative effects on smaller shareholders who have limited protection, an 
issue documented by a recent study conducted by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) and the Union of Arab Securities Authorities (UASA) (OECD-
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UASA, 2014). Despite the prevalence of the closely-held business model in Jordan, many 
Jordanian companies are formed as public listed companies and are therefore required to use the 
International Financial Reporting Standards, mandatory in Jordan since 1998 (Jordan Securities 
Commission (JSC), 1998). Of particular importance is the International Accounting Standard 
(IAS) No. 24 on RPTs, which requires determining related parties and adequately disclosing 
RPTs (IASB, 2009). In such a business environment, the negative effects of RPTs can be large, 
and companies involved in RPTs may attempt to limit disclosure of such transactions in order to 
limit public attention to them. 
 
It is therefore interesting to study RPTs and factors affecting their presence and size in a 
developing country setting such as Jordan. Knowing these factors is important in order to better 
monitor companies and their RPT activities by regulatory authorities in Jordan or other 
developing countries. These authorities can, therefore, intervene when deemed useful in order to 
control any illegitimate RPTs. Therefore, due to possibilities of large-scale RPTs in Jordan, this 
study is motivated by the need to identify companies more likely to engage in illegitimate RPTs, 
in order for the regulatory authorities to better monitor them and enact legislation to improve 
their corporate governance systems and restrict the possibilities of illegitimate RPTs, thus 
improving investment opportunities in Jordan through providing more protection to smaller 
shareholders.  
 
In particular, this study aims to contribute to our knowledge through exploring any 
potential effects on RPTs from financial and governance factors that characterise Jordanian 
companies. These factors include firm profitability, financial leverage, ownership concentration, 
CEO-duality, board size, board independence, political connections, and type of audit firm. 
These factors have been found by several international studies to potentially affect the 
application of negative RPTs that may harm some investors, especially minority investors (see, 
for example, Nekhili & Cherif, 2011; Munir et al., 2013; Williams & Taylor, 2013; Kang et al, 
2014; Utama & Utama, 2014; Hwang & Wang, 2015; Bava & Di Trana, 2017; Boateng & 
Huang, 2017; Dicko, 2017; Habib et al., 2017a; Habib et al., 2017b; Bhuiyan & Roudaki, 2018; 
Habib & Muhammadi, 2018). While a developing country like Jordan may be vulnerable to the 
negative effects of RPTs, the characteristics of Jordanian companies may have their effect on the 
degree to which the above-mentioned factors may affect the occurrence of RPTs. The findings of 
this study are likely to significantly contribute to our knowledge, as this topic has rarely been 
explored in Jordan and other developing countries.  
 
2. THE JORDANIAN CORPORATE CONTEXT 
 
Thousands of companies operate in Jordan, mostly as partnerships or limited liability companies. 
However, the number of public listed companies on the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) is only 
193, with shares of a further 45 companies traded on the Over-the-Counter market 
(www.ase.com.jo, as on March 24, 2019). These companies are classified into three main 
categories (each including several sub-categories) according to their activities; financial, 
services, and industrial. These companies are under the supervision and follow the regulations of 
the Jordan Securities Commission (JSC). In addition, some of these companies, based on the 
nature of their businesses, are under additional supervision and regulation by specialised 
authorities (such as the Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ) in the case of banks). However, as 
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mentioned earlier, a large number of Jordanian public listed companies from various business 
sectors are closely-held, and in some cases, have a large family ownership, leading to concerns 
about appropriate corporate governance practices being implemented, especially protecting the 
rights of minority shareholders (Abdullatif & Al-Khadash, 2010; Solomon, 2010; Shanikat & 
Abbadi, 2011; Haddad et al., 2015; Abdullatif & Kawuq, 2015; Abdullatif; 2016; Alhadab, 
2018).  
 
Given this background, the regulatory authorities in Jordan started to consider issuing 
corporate governance codes, and the first of such efforts were guidelines for banks (published in 
2004) and for insurance companies (published in 2006) (Jordan Institute of Directors, 2013). 
Guidelines for banks were later revised, most recently in 2016. In 2008, the JSC issued its first 
corporate governance code to apply to all public listed companies. In summary, this code 
provided that the board of directors be comprised of five to thirteen members, be elected by the 
company's general assembly for a period of four years, and not include members of boards of 
directors of competitors in the same business. In addition, the chairman of the board was 
required not to hold an executive position in the company. The code provided for the 
establishment of an audit committee in the company, of which shall include at least three non-
executive board members who have knowledge in accounting and finance, one of which is a 
specialist in the area by academic qualification or work experience. Regarding the general rights 
of shareholders, the code provided that they could, among other issues, vote in a general 
assembly meeting according to their number of shares owned, receive dividends if a decision on 
that is made, and have priority in buying new shares in the company before these shares get 
offered to the public. The company should disclose its periodic financial reports, ownership of its 
board and top executive managers and their relatives in the company's shares, RPTs, and the 
privileges enjoyed by the members of the company's board and executive management. As for 
external auditors, the company should select a licensed audit firm to audit the company's 
financial statements for a year, with this appointment renewable. The audit partner has to be 
rotated every four years and can be re-elected after two years from the rotation. It is notable that 
the 2008 code adopted a "comply or explain" approach, where companies not complying with the 
code had to explain non-compliance in their annual reports (JSC, 2008).  
 
In 2017, the JSC revised the above code. In addition to retaining much of what was 
mentioned in the previous code, notable revisions in the new code include providing that that the 
board of directors should have a majority of non-executive members, and at least one third of its 
members be independent (examples of non-independence include the member or any of his first-
degree relatives working for the company, having business transactions with the company 
exceeding 50,000 Jordanian dinars, owning 5 per cent or more of the company's shares, or 
working for the company's external audit firm).  The chairman of the board cannot hold an 
executive position in the company, and any of his first-degree relatives cannot be the CEO of the 
company. In addition to the audit committee, the company has to establish a governance 
committee, both of which have to be comprised of at least three non-executive board members 
with a majority of these being independent board members. The governance committee is 
responsible for preparing a governance report to be included in the company's annual report, 
including the details of compliance of the company with the code. As for the external audit firm, 
the revised code allows it to provide consulting services to the company after approval from the 
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board (JSC, 2017). It is early to judge the degree of incremental effectiveness this code will have 
in improving corporate governance practices in Jordan, since it is very recent. 
 
Regarding related parties, the 2008 code included in its definition of related parties 
members of the company's boards of directors or top executive managers; persons holding over 5 
per cent of shares of the company or any of its affiliates; the relatives and partners of these 
parties; and the company's affiliates and joint ventures. RPTs were defined as transactions with 
related parties valued at more than 50,000 Jordanian dinars. Disclosures about RPTs have to be 
made, and the audit committee is responsible for ensuring that these transactions do not include 
conflicts of interest (JSC, 2008). The 2017 code added to the previous definition any companies 
controlled by members of the company's board or top executive management or their first-degree 
relatives and defined RPTs as transactions with related parties which equal or exceed 5 per cent 
of the company's assets. The audit committee has to make a recommendation about RPTs to the 
board before they are made, and to revise RPTs to ensure that they do not include conflicts of 
interest. RPTs have to be approved by the general assembly before they are made, with the 
related party involved not voting on this decision. To facilitate this, the board is required to 
provide the general assembly with information related to the RPT and the external auditor's 
evaluation of it, and a written assurance that the RPT is in the interest of the shareholders (JSC, 
2017).  
 
Despite the efforts put in by various regulatory authorities in Jordan to improve corporate 
governance in Jordanian companies, it is arguable that the characteristics of Jordanian companies 
will probably limit the effectiveness of such regulations. As mentioned earlier, many of the 
Jordanian public listed companies are closely-held. These companies have a high concentration 
of ownership by block shareholders (this figure went as high as about 99 per cent for some 
observations in this study). Such large shareholders may affect the application of the above 
governance guidelines by, for example, not complying with them and explaining the 
noncompliance. In addition, while CEO-duality is currently limited in Jordanian public listed 
companies, especially in banks and insurance companies, it is not uncommon to find Jordanian 
public listed companies with boards with a number of same-family members, and with the CEO 
being a close relative (e.g. son or brother) of the chairman of the board of directors. Even when 
boards are diverse and include independent members, the effect of block shareholders in 
appointing board members and top executive management positions is likely to limit the 
effectiveness of independent board members in securing high-quality corporate governance. 
Such boards of directors would not be inclined to demand a highly-effective audit committee 
(Abdullaif et al., 2015) or a high-quality external audit. Therefore, the external audit function 
would arguably be limited in its effectiveness as a governance mechanism (Abdullatif, 2016). 
This is consistent with the results of Jeong and Rho (2004) in Korea, Yasar (2013) in Turkey, 
and Alhadab (2018) in Jordan, where big audit firms were found not to differ from smaller audit 
firms in terms of audit quality in contexts where high-quality audits are not under high demand. 
Nurazi et al. (2015) found relatively similar results in Indonesia, where the presence of a big 
audit firm did not have a significant effect on the practice of negative RPTs. In summary, while 
many corporate governance codes applied in Jordan and other developing countries are based on 
what is perceived as effective practices in more-developed countries, the effectiveness of such 
practices in developing countries with different governance models is questionable (Chanda et 
al., 2017; Uddin et al., 2017). 
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  Considering the block shareholder and closely-held business nature of many Jordanian 
companies, this would lead to lowering agency costs between managers and owners (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). However, such an ownership system could lead to principal vs. principal 
agency costs, with family owner-managers having the power of control and decision making that 
can be used for the interests of the family members at the expense of other shareholders 
(Kallmuenzer, 2015). In such a context, the protection of minority shareholders is generally low 
due to limited accountability and transparency of board members and managers (Solomon, 
2010). One method of exploiting the weaknesses of minority shareholders is through engagement 
in RPTs that are for the particular benefits of the large shareholders. According to OECD-UASA 
(2014), there is widespread evidence of the use of RPTs in MENA countries, including Jordan. 
This can arguably be attributed to low agency costs in Jordan between managers and board 
members, coupled with limited protection of minority shareholders mitigating the effects of any 
agency issues between large and small Jordanian shareholders (Abdullatif, 2016). Potential 
negative effects of such RPTs are discussed in more detail in the following section. 
 
3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1. Related Party Transactions  
 
There are two different arguments about the economic incentives of companies to enter into 
RPTs, one suggesting that RPTs may be beneficial to the company and all of its shareholders, 
while the other suggests that they may be used to benefit the larger shareholders and therefore 
harm the smaller shareholders (El-Helaly, 2018; Fang et al., 2018). Regarding the former 
argument, RPTs can be sometimes used for the benefit of the company and all its shareholders, 
through transferring funds from controlling shareholders to the company (Williams & Taylor, 
2013). Such RPTs may lead to a decrease in operational costs (Srinivasan, 2013; Di Carlo, 2014) 
and to improvement in monitoring activities of the company by controlling shareholders (Utama 
& Utama, 2014).  
 
However, it is the negative effect of RPTs, referred to as "tunnelling" (Johnson et al., 
2000), that has been the matter of most concern in academic literature and for regulators and 
stakeholders of companies. The main concern here is that dominant shareholders would exploit 
their control of the firm to expropriate funds from it for their own benefit, thus harming minority 
shareholders (Utama & Utama, 2009; Williams & Taylor, 2013; Di Carlo, 2014; Kang et al., 
2014; Bona-Sanchez et al., 2017; Habib et al., 2017a). Several methods may be used in 
performing tunnelling activities. These include excessive payments to family members of 
controlling shareholders who hold top executive management jobs (Utama & Utama, 2009), 
conducting transactions with related party companies at unfair prices or terms (Utama & Utama, 
2014), or giving loans to related parties at interest rates significantly different from the prevailing 
rates (Manaligod, 2012), all to the detriment of small shareholders and, to some extent, other 
stakeholders of the company. 
 
Another potential negative effect of RPTs is that they can be used in committing 
fraudulent financial reporting. The existence of RPTs increases the possibility of such fraud 
being committed by the management of companies using RPTs to misstate the values of financial 
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transactions (e.g. sales or purchases) (Arens et al., 2017). Additional fraud may also be 
committed by management deliberately concealing their questionable RPTs through not 
disclosing their nature and amount according to IAS 24 requirements (Hayes et al., 2014). 
Kohlbeck and Mayhew (2017) found a significant association between RPTs and the likelihood 
of material misstatements in financial statements, while Lee et al. (2014) found that 
comparability of financial statements decreases with an increase in the size and volatility of 
RPTs. Indeed, such fraud is expected to benefit the controlling shareholders at the expense of 
financial statement users.       
 
As mentioned earlier, the practice of tunnelling and fraudulent RPTs has potentially 
damaging effects to minority shareholders and other company stakeholders. In economically-
developed countries, improved regulations and corporate governance systems can, to some 
extent, mitigate such effects. However, in developing countries, the problems of RPTs are 
expected to be significantly larger, as protection of minority rights is limited due to controlling 
shareholders being family members or the state, coupled with weak enforcement of regulations 
(Williams & Taylor, 2013). In the MENA region, corporate governance systems in companies 
have been described as having high power distance (Aghimien, 2016) and limited transparency 
and disclosure (Nadal, 2013), in addition to facing several structural issues including weaknesses 
in development of stock markets, legal controls, and investor protection, in addition to economic 
uncertainty, family control of companies, and high ownership concentration (Shehata, 2015). In 
their report, OECD-UASA (2014) mentioned the wide use of RPTs in the MENA region, 
particularly highlighting the high potential of tunnelling by using RPTs between a company and 
its controlling shareholder. They highlighted the serious risk of abusing RPTs by top managers 
and controlling shareholders in the MENA region, and linked it to closely-held governance 
systems and limited protection of non-controlling shareholders in this region (OECD-UASA, 
2014).With Jordan, the context of this study, being a MENA country characterised by many of 
the issues reported above, this study aims to contribute to our knowledge through studying RPTs 
and their determinants in such a context. 
 
3.2. Determinants of Related Party Transactions 
 
Literature on the determinants of RPTs is limited, due to most of the extant literature on RPTs 
focussing on their potential effects on other factors (such as financial performance or earnings 
management), rather than looking at the existence of RPTs themselves and treating them as a 
dependent variable. On this issue, the extant literature is mainly from Western countries or from 
China, and does report some financial and governance factors that may lead to an effect on the 
number and amount of RPTs. Many of these studies are listed below. 
 
As for the financial factors that potentially affect RPTs, two of the most cited factors are 
firm performance and profitability, and firm leverage. The International Standard on Auditing 
No. 240 (ISA 240), issued by the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board 
(IAASB) considers matters such as decreasing profitability and decreasing ability to generate 
debt as fraud risk factors (IAASB, 2009). In a survey study by Smith et al. (2005), financial 
factors were found to be the most important fraud risk factors. Therefore, if a company is facing 
problems of deteriorating profitability or cash flows, it is possible that it may engage in RPTs in 
order to deal with that. Empirical international studies have generally found a negative relation 
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between RPTs and financial performance (Gallery et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2009; Srinivasan, 
2013; Williams & Taylor, 2013; Bava & Di Trana, 2017). Other international studies have 
generally found a positive relation between RPTs and leverage (Nekhili & Cherif, 2011; Utama 
& Utama, 2014).  
 
This study attempts to test the existence of similar relations in the developing country 
context of Jordan. In Jordan, companies vary significantly in terms of their levels of profitability 
and leverage. However, the prevalent closely-held system of ownership and governance of 
companies, coupled with the limited protection of minority shareholders, is likely to make 
engaging in RPTs easier. Therefore, using RPTs in a negative manner may be a reason for lower 
profitability levels and higher financial leverage levels for some Jordanian companies. Therefore, 
this study tests the following hypotheses: 
 
H1: Profitability is negatively associated with the existence of RPTs in Jordanian companies. 
 
H2: Financial leverage is positively associated with the existence of RPTs in Jordanian 
companies. 
 
Similar to its consideration of financial problems as pressures that may lead to fraud, ISA 
240 considers problems with company governance (such as too much power given to one or a 
few individuals without sufficient monitoring of their activities) as opportunities that are 
considered fraud risk factors (IAASB, 2009).  Surveys by Apostolou et al. (2001) and Abdullatif 
(2013) found that factors related to management characteristics were considered among the most 
important fraud risk factors. Indeed, Alhadab (2018) found that managers of Jordanian public 
firms manipulate reported income using discretionary accruals to meet their compensation 
targets (pay-performance compensation). Further, ownership concentration, especially by family 
members, may lead to abuse of power at the expense of minority shareholders from outside the 
family, especially when family shareholders participate in management (Bammens et al., 2011). 
This, in turn, suggests that if managers have the incentive (e.g. obtaining a private gain) and the 
power (e.g. CEO-duality), they may engage in RPTs to maximize their wealth at the expense of 
other parties (e.g. minority shareholders).  
  
Issues such as ownership concentration and CEO-duality were found by several 
international studies as affecting RPTs. For example, Hu et al. (2009), Nekhili and Cherif (2011), 
Huyghebaert and Wang, (2012), Juliarto et al. (2013), Munir et al. (2013), Kang et al. (2014), 
and Utama and Utama (2014) all found significant relations between the power of controlling or 
managing shareholders and the occurrence of RPTs, with the general finding being that such 
power by these parties is positively connected to the occurrence of RPTs. A general 
interpretation of this finding is that dominant directors may use RPTs to tunnel funds for their 
personal benefits, with CEO-duality a supporting factor.  
 
 
This study attempts to test the existence of similar relations in the developing country 
context of Jordan. In Jordan, a large percentage of companies have highly concentrated 
ownership levels, and some have CEO-duality. The prevalent closely-held system of ownership 
and governance of companies, coupled with limited protection of minority shareholders, is likely 
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to make engaging in RPTs easier for companies where ownership concentration is high, and 
many board members have close relations to each other and to the top executive officers in the 
company. Therefore, this study tests the following hypotheses: 
 
H3: Ownership concentration is positively associated with the existence of RPTs in Jordanian 
companies. 
 
H4: CEO duality is positively associated with the existence of RPTs in Jordanian companies. 
 
Other related factors potentially affecting RPTs include the size of the board of directors 
and the existence of independent board members. As for board size, determining an optimal size 
can be a function of the effectiveness of monitoring between insider and outsider directors 
(Garner et al., 2017). Few studies covered the issue of board size and its effects on corporate 
governance or financial performance, and these studies found mixed results as to whether board 
size matters, or whether larger or smaller boards are more effective. For example, Nurazi et al. 
(2015) found no significant relationship between board size and tunnelling. However, a negative 
relation was found between board size and firm value (Kumar & Singh, 2013) and board size and 
firm financial performance (Orozco et al., 2018). On the other hand, a positive relation was 
found between board size and financial performance by Romano and Garrini (2014), Ali (2018), 
and Rashid (2018). Also, Hwang and Wang (2015) found that smaller boards are more likely to 
engage in earnings management.    
 
Regarding board independence, unlike block shareholders, who may abuse their power at 
the expense of minority shareholders (Bammens et al, 2011), independent board members are 
expected to better protect the rights of shareholders, given their expected freedom from conflicts 
of interest and limited agency problems (Monks & Minow, 2008; Garner et al., 2017). Boateng 
and Huang (2017) found that the existence of multiple non-controlling large shareholders in a 
company restricted the ability of controlling shareholders to practice tunnelling. Similarly, Chen 
et al. (2014) found positive effects of independent directors on controlling tunnelling. Although 
such effectiveness of independent board members may be limited if they are appointed by the 
CEO, interlocked, older in age, or hold multiple board memberships (Core et al., 1999), several 
studies showed positive effects of independent board members. These studies include Chen et al. 
(2014), Wu and Li (2015), Zhu et al. (2016), Boateng and Huang (2017), and Reguera-Alvarado 
and Bravo (2017).  
 
This study attempts to test the existence of similar relations in the developing country 
context of Jordan. In Jordan, board sizes vary considerably (In this study, they ranged between 
three and fourteen members per board). However, given that the prevalent closely-held system of 
ownership and governance of companies, coupled with limited protection of minority 
shareholders, is likely to make engaging in RPTs easier for companies, it can be argued that a 
larger board size, especially if coupled with a larger percentage of independent board members, 
is likely to reduce the level of a company's engagement in negative RPTs. Therefore, this study 
tests the following hypotheses: 
 
H5: Board size is negatively associated with the existence of RPTs in Jordanian companies. 
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H6: Board independence is negatively associated with the existence of RPTs in Jordanian 
companies. 
 
In addition to the above-mentioned factors, another potential factor that can have an 
effect on the use of RPTs is the political connections of the company or members of its board of 
directors or top executive management. Evidence on the effects of political connections on firm 
value or firm financial performance is mixed, with studies including Wu et al. (2012), Su and 
Fung (2013), Wang and Lin (2016), Mohammed et al. (2017), and Maaloul et al. (2018) finding 
a positive relation, explained by Maaloul et al. (2018) as a result of the power of the political 
ties, and the willingness of investors to invest in companies with strong political ties. However, 
Jaffar and Abdul-Shukor (2016) and Saeed et al. (2016) found a negative relation between 
political connections and firm value. Despite the possible effect of political connections on firm 
performance and firm value, several studies documented the potential negative effects of 
political connections on the governance of companies, especially in less-developed countries. 
For example, Dicko (2017) found that politically connected companies are associated with 
lower-quality governance, especially regarding board functions and minority shareholders' 
protection, while You and Du (2012) found that CEOs with political connections are more 
powerful in that they are less likely to be dismissed. Cheng et al. (2015), Habib et al. (2017b), 
and Hu et al. (2017) found that the presence of political connections is likely to lead to the 
selection of lower quality audit firms, while Mohammed et al. (2017) found that such a presence 
is likely to lead to a reduction in accounting conservatism. Regarding the potential effects of 
political connections on RPTs in particular, several studies (including Wang & Lin, 2016; Habib 
et al., 2017a; Habib et al., 2017b; Habib & Muhammadi, 2018) found a positive relationship 
between political connections and the use of RPTs in tunnelling activities, with Habib and 
Muhammadi (2018) associating the existence of RPTs in politically-connected companies with a 
longer audit reporting lag resulting from the need for more audit efforts to deal with the possible 
negative effects of RPTs.  
 
This study attempts to test the existence of the effects of political connections on RPTs in 
the developing country context of Jordan. In Jordan, some companies have several sorts of 
political connections, including partial ownership of a company by the government or an 
individual politician. The prevalent system of governance of Jordanian companies, coupled with 
limited protection of minority shareholders, is likely to make engaging in RPTs easier for 
companies where some owners are politically connected. Therefore, this study tests the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H7: Political connections are positively associated with the existence of RPTs in Jordanian 
companies. 
 
A final potential governance factor affecting RPTs is the choice of external audit firm. It 
is generally accepted by much audit literature that Big Four audit firms provide audits of higher 
quality than non-Big Four audit firms (e.g. Francis, 2004; DeFond & Zhang, 2014; Knechel & 
Shefchik, 2014). In terms of RPTs, several international studies have found that RPTs are at a  
relatively lower level when companies use Big Four audit firms than when they use other audit 
firms (and vice versa) (Huyghebaert and Wang, 2012; Bennouri et al., 2015; Cheng et al., 2015; 
Khan et al., 2016; Habib et al., 2017b; Bhuiyan & Roudaki, 2018). 
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 This study attempts to test the existence of a similar relation between the type of audit 
firm and RPTs in the developing country context of Jordan. In Jordan, Big Four audit firms 
generally tend to issue longer audit reports with more disclosure of information about the client 
and its audit (e.g. through more disclosure of key audit matters). In addition, clients of Big Four 
audit firms generally tend to have more disclosure in their notes to the financial statements. 
Despite the prevalent system of governance of Jordanian companies putting pressure on all types 
of audit firms as to the level of audit quality, the level of disclosure by audit firms and their 
clients gives an impression of some variability regarding audit quality among audit firms in 
Jordan. Therefore, it can be expected that Big Four audit firms in Jordan may have some effect 
on restricting the level of engagement in RPTs by their clients. Given that, this study tests the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H8: The use of a Big Four audit firm is negatively associated with the existence of RPTs in 
Jordanian companies. 
  
4 . RESEARCH METHOD 
 
4.1. Study Population and Sample 
 
The sample of this study consists of Jordanian industrial companies publicly listed on the 
Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) over the period 2011-2017. IAS 24 has been effective since 
January 1, 2011. The sample period, therefore, starts in 2011 to cover disclosure of RPTs by 
Jordanian public listed companies after its implementation.  Data concerning RPTs and their 
determinants were collected from several sources. The ASE website (ase.com.jo) was used to 
collect financial data, while financial reports were downloaded and used to collect data 
concerning the governance variables and other control variables. Financial and insurance 
companies were excluded from the sample due to the differences related to their financial 
reporting process (Alhadab 2015; Alhadab & Tahat, 2016; Alhadab, 2017). After imposing 
restriction to companies with the necessary data for the analysis, the final sample consisted of 
432 company-year observations over the sample period from 2011 to 2017. 
 
4.2. Measurement of Variables 
 
4.2.1. Related party transactions  
 
Data concerning the financial transactions of related parties were collected from the financial 
statements over the sample period. In this study, RPTs are defined as any sales, purchases, 
accounts payable, and accounts receivable transactions between the company and its related 
parties.  
 
To examine the total effect of RPTs, we follow prior research (Ryngaert & Thomas, 
2012; El-Helaly et al., 2018) and use a dummy variable (RPTs) that equals 1 if the sum of sales, 
purchases, and the outstanding balance between the company and its related parties exceeds 1 
per cent of total assets in the company-year, and zero otherwise. As indicated by Ryngaert and 
Thomas (2012), using a dummy variable to measure RPTs would overcome measurement errors 
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associated with using raw dollar values for RPTs. The sales represent the amounts of all revenue 
transactions during a year between a company and its related parties. The purchases represent the 
amounts of all purchase transactions during a year between a company and its related parties. 
The outstanding balance represents the difference between all accounts payable and accounts 
receivable transactions during a year between a company and its related parties.  
 
4.2.2. Determinants of related party transactions  
 
This study examines several determinant factors that are expected to affect RPTs. The first 
determinant is the profitability ratio of return on assets (ROA), which is calculated as net income 
divided by total assets.  The second determinant is the financial leverage ratio (LEV), which is 
calculated as total debt divided by total assets. The third determinant is the ownership 
concentration (OWCN), which is defined as the total ownership percentage of shares owned by 
individual or institutional shareholders who each own 5 per cent or more of the company's 
shares. The fourth determinant is CEO-duality (CEO), which is a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
the CEO is the board chairman, or if both share the same family name (e.g. brothers or 
father/son), and zero otherwise. The fifth determinant is board size (BDSIZE), which is 
calculated as the number of directors on the board. The sixth determinant is board independence 
(BDIND), which is defined as the percentage of outside directors on the board and calculated by 
dividing the number of outside directors by the number of total directors on the board. The 
seventh determinant is a proxy of political connection (GOVSHHLD), which is defined as the 
total ownership percentage of shares owned by a government or its representatives. Finally, the 
eighth determinant is a proxy of audit quality (BIG4), which is defined as a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the audit firm is one of the Big Four, and zero otherwise. Table 1 shows details of 
how the variables used in this study were measured. 
 
Table 1 
Definition of the variables  
Variable Definition 
RPTs A dummy variable that equals 1 if the sum of sales, purchases, and the outstanding 
balance between the company and its related parties exceeds 1 percent of total assets in 
the firm-year, and zero otherwise. 
ROA The profitability ratio of return on assets, calculated as net income divided by total 
assets. 
LEV The financial leverage ratio, calculated as total debt divided by total assets. 
OWCN The total ownership percentage of shares owned by individual or institutional 
shareholders who each own 5 per cent or more shares in the company 
CEO A dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO is the board chairman, or if both share the 
same family name (e.g. brothers or father/son), and zero otherwise. 
BDSIZE The number of directors on the board 
BDIND  The percentage of outside directors on the board, calculated by dividing the number of 
outside directors by the number of total directors on the board 
GOVSHHLD The total ownership percentage of shares owned by government or its representatives. 
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BIG4 A dummy variable that equals 1 if the audit firm is one of the Big Four, and zero 
otherwise. 
SIZE The natural logarithm of total assets 
CFO  Operating cash flows 




4.3. Empirical Model 
 
To investigate the relationship between the potential determinant factors and RPTs, the following 
logit model is estimated. The dependent variable is a proxy of RPTs, and the independent 
variables represent the determinant factors and other associated control variables. The model is 
as follows:  
 
(1)
ε Year IND   SLGRW β 
CFO β  SIZEβBIG4βGOVSHHLD  βBDIND  β
 BDSIZE β CEOβOWCNβ  LEVβROA  βα RPTs
11
9876








The measurement of the dependent variable and the independent variables was provided 
earlier. As can be seen from the previous studies used in the hypotheses development, these 
independent variables can potentially affect RPTs in Jordan. The model also controls for the size 
effect by adding the natural logarithm of total assets (SIZE), while growth opportunities are 
controlled by adding operating cash flows (CFO) and sales growth (SLGRW) into the model. 
Finally, dummy variables are included into the model to control for industry and time effects 
(IND and Year).  
 
We use the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) to check for multicollinearity in our 
regression analysis. The test of the VIF shows that our results reported in Tables 4, 5, and 6 are 




5.1. Descriptive Statistics  
 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for all variables examined in this study. It shows that the 
mean value of RPTs is 0.721, suggesting that more than 72 percent of the total sample exhibit 
evidence of RPTs. In terms of the determinants, Table 2 shows that the mean (median) values of 
ROA, LEV, OWCN, CEO, BDSIZE, BDIND, GOVSHHLD, and BIG4 are -0.724 (0.009), 38.944 
(33.065), 62.014 (65.865), 0.317 (0.000), 7.525 (7.000), 0.741 (0.750), 0.047 (0.000), 0.347 
(0.000), respectively. In general, the mean values are greater than the median values, suggesting 
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that these variables are positively skewed. It can be seen that the percentage of ownership 
concentration is high among Jordanian public firms where the mean value of OWCN is 62 per 
cent, and that CEO-duality is not uncommon. In addition, the majority of the sample companies 
are audited by non-Big Four audit firms.  
 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics for the sample over the period. 
      Mean           SD       Median           Min           Max 
RPTs 0.721 0.449 1.000 0.000 1.000 
ROA -0.724 11.418 0.009 -195.296 36.071 
LEV 38.944 32.738 33.065 -27.201 366.035 
OWCN 62.014 24.788 65.865 0.000 100.000 
CEO 0.317 0.466 0.000 0.000 1.000 
BDSIZE 7.525 2.168 7.000 3.000 14.000 
BDIND  0.741 0.142 0.750 0.167 1.000 
GOVSHHLD 0.047 0.123 0.000 0.000 0.610 
BIG4 0.347 0.477 0.000 0.000 1.000 
SIZE 16.549 1.566 16.553 10.825 20.925 
CFO (JD Mill) 5.319 25.787 0.627 -44.011 310.878 
N 432         
Note: this table presents descriptive statistics for all variables. Definitions of all variables are 
presented in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 3 presents the correlation matrix and shows that the determinant factors (OWCN), 
(LEV) and (BIG4) are positively correlated with RPTs. It can also be seen that CEO-duality 
(CEO) and firm board independence (BDIND) are negatively correlated with RPTs. Similar 























  RPTs ROA  LEV  OWCN CEO BDSIZE BDIND GOVSHHLD BIG4 SIZE CFO  SLGRW 
RPTs 1 
  ROA   0.072 1 
LEV  0.155** -0.161** 1 
OWCN 0.233*** -0.037 0.122* 1 
CEO -0.219*** 0.059 -0.062 -0.082 1 
BDSIZE -0.027 0.022 -0.242*** -0.325*** -0.140** 1 
BDIND -0.167** -0.095 0.008 -0.098 -0.186*** 0.372*** 1 
GOVSHHLD 0.016 0.008 -0.023 0.220*** -0.255*** 0.205*** 0.063 1 
BIG4 0.146** -0.025 -0.029 0.190*** -0.290*** 0.146** 0.105* 0.328*** 1 
SIZE 0.060 0.165** -0.004 0.123* -0.143** 0.247*** 0.137** 0.376*** 0.217*** 1 
CFO  -0.162** 0.047 -0.127* 0.162** -0.086 0.272*** 0.121* 0.489*** 0.231*** 0.416*** 1 
SLGRW 0.043 0.015 -0.023 0.086 -0.007 0.130* 0.147** 0.127* 0.073 0.178*** 0.014 1 
This table presents a Pearson correlation matrix for all variables. Definitions of all variables are presented in Table 1. ***, ** and *, denote significance at the 1, 
5, and 10 per cent levels, respectively. Robust t statistics are in parentheses. 
5.2. Empirical Results 
5.2.1. Financial determinants of RPTs 
 
The results of the regression analysis between all of the independent variables and the dependent 
variable (RPTs) are presented in Table 4. Regarding financial factors, it can be seen that there is 
no statistically significant relation between the profitability of the company, measured by its 
ROA, and RPTs, with the coefficient being a positive 0.027 that is statistically insignificant. As 
for financial leverage, it is found to have a positive statistically significant relation with RPTs at 
only the 10 per cent level, with a positive coefficient of 0.020. As a result, hypothesis H1 
(profitability is negatively related with RPTs) is rejected, while hypothesis H2 (financial 
leverage is positively related with RPTs) is accepted. These findings can arguably be explained 
by the effect of the general governance systems of many Jordanian companies that may make 
larger shareholders inclined to engage in RPTs regardless of the level of firm profitability. This 
tendency is also expected to increase in the case of higher levels of financial leverage, a finding 
generally consistent with those of many previous international studies.   
 
Table 4 
Logistic regression estimation: the association between all determinant variables and RPTs.  
 Logit regression  























Industry dummy  Yes 
Year dummy  Yes 






Note: This table reports the results of Logistic regression estimates of the determinant variables of RPT proxies. The 
dependent variable is a dummy variable (RPTs) that equals 1 if the sum of sales, purchases, and the outstanding 
balance between the company and its related parties exceeds 1 percent of total assets in the firm-year, and zero 
otherwise. Definitions of all variables are presented in Table 1. ***, ** and *, denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 
per cent levels, respectively. Robust t statistics are in parentheses. 
 
 
5.2.2. Board of directors' characteristics as determinants of RPTs 
 
Table 4 reports the results on the relationships between several independent variables related to 
corporate governance and RPTs. These independent variables include company ownership 
concentration, CEO-duality, board size, board independence, and political connections. Table 4 
shows evidence of a statistically significant positive relation between ownership concentration 
and RPTs, with a positive coefficient of 0.023 that is significant at the 1 per cent level. This 
finding is expected given that under the governance system common in Jordanian companies, 
along with limited protection of minority shareholders, companies with higher concentration of 
ownership have more incentives to exploit RPTs for their advantage. As for CEO-duality, Table 
4 shows a statistically significant negative relation between it and RPTs, with a negative 
coefficient of -1.144 that is significant at the 1 per cent level. This finding is not consistent with 
those of many previous studies, but it may suggest that the power of dominant shareholders in 
Jordanian firms will undermine that of the CEO, regardless of the CEO's relation with the board 
members. These results mean that hypothesis H3 (ownership concentration positively related 
with RPTs) is accepted, while hypothesis H4 (CEO-duality positively related with RPTs) is 
rejected. 
 
Regarding board size and board independence, Table 4 shows statistically significant 
relations between the two variables and RPTs at the 1 per cent level, with board size showing a 
0.314 positive coefficient and board independence showing a -5.849 negative coefficient.  These 
results mean that at the 1 per cent level, hypothesis H5 (board size is negatively related with 
RPTs) is rejected and hypothesis H6 (board independence is negatively related with RPTs) is 
accepted. These findings suggest that the board size of Jordanian companies may not be 
considered an effective corporate governance mechanism unless it was dominated by outside 
directors.  Finally, Table 4 reports evidence that political connections are not associated with 
RPTs.  The coefficient of GOVSHHLD is -0.401 and is statistically insignificant. As a result, 
hypothesis H7 (political connections are positively related with RPTs) is rejected. This finding is 
not consistent with those of many previous studies. However, potential explanations for it 
include first that RPTs may be widespread in Jordanian companies regardless of whether they are 
politically connected or not. Another potential explanation is that politically connected 
companies in the Jordanian industrial sector, despite generally being highly concentrated, have 
some tendency to be among the largest and most influential industrial companies for the 
Jordanian economy, and are therefore likely to be more monitored by Jordanian authorities and 
(in cases where this applies) by their international block owners. 
Chi2 65.87 
Pseudo R2 0.2407 
Log likelihood  -185.482                  
Mean VIF  1.84 
N 413 
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5.2.3. Audit quality as a determinant of RPTs 
 
Regarding results on the relationship between audit quality and RPTs, Table 4 shows that the 
coefficient for audit quality is 0.893 and it is statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. 
Therefore, hypothesis H8 (audit quality negatively related with RPTs) is rejected. This finding is 
relatively consistent with that of Alhadab (2018), which shows evidence that audit quality is not 
associated with financial reporting quality in Jordan, and with the findings reported earlier, 
especially from developing countries (e.g. Yasar, 2013). This evidence can be attributed to the 
potential weakness of all types of audit firms, including the Big Four firms, in confronting 
powerful clients who are generally governed with a closely-held system, frequently with high 
ownership concentration levels, and do not tend to demand an external audit of high quality.  
 
5.2.4. The control variables and RPTs 
 
The results on the relationship between control variables and RPTs are also shown on Table 4. 
They show evidence that operating cash flows are associated with RPTs with a coefficient of       
-0.030 that is statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. On the other hand, Table 4 shows no 
evidence of a statistically significant relationship between company size and RPTs. 
 
In summary, the results reported in Table 4 generally provide new evidence on factors 
determining RPTs in Jordan. In particular, RPTs are positively associated with financial 
leverage, ownership concentration, board size, and audit quality. Further, RPTs in Jordan are 
negatively associated with CEO-duality, board independence, and operating cash flows. 
 
6. ADDITIONAL TESTS 
 
6.1. Endogeneity Test  
 
To ensure that our results are not driven by the endogenous relation between related party 
transactions and firm’s specific characteristics (e.g. financial leverage, ownership concentration, 
etc.), we follow Bennouri et al. (2015) and use the system of Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) to address the endogeneity issue. Using the system of GMM, according to Bennouri et 
al. (2015), provides consistent and efficient coefficient estimators especially when examining 
small panel data, controls for time-invariant fixed effects that may bias the estimation of the 
dependent variable, and addresses issues related to omitted variables, autocorrelation, and 
heteroscedasticity. Thus, the following model is estimated using a system GMM.  
 
(2)ε  CFO β 
SIZE β  RPTs-LagβBIG4βGOVSHHLD  βBDIND  β
 BDSIZE β CEOβOWCNβ  LEVβROA  βα RPTs
11
9876








The results are reported in Table 5, and show relatively similar results to those reported in Table 
4. In particular, Table 5 shows evidence that RPTs are positively associated with company 
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profitability (ROA), leverage (LEV), ownership concentration (OWCN), board size (BDSIZE), 
audit quality (BIG4), and lag of RPTs (Lag-RPTs). While board independence (BDIND) is found 
to be negatively associated with RPTs. Thus, these results confirm that our results are robust 
even after controlling for the endogeneity concern. 
 
Table 5 
GMM regression estimation: the association between all determinant variables and RPTs. 
 Logit regression 

























Note: This table reports the results of a system GMM regression of the determinant variables of RPT proxies, 
addressing the endogeneity concern. The dependent variable is a dummy variable (RPTs) that equals 1 if the sum 
of sales, purchases, and the outstanding balance between the company and its related parties exceeds 1 percent of 
total assets in the company-year, and zero otherwise. Where (Lag-RPTs) is the lag value of RPTs, and all other 
variables are previously defined in Table 1. ***, ** and *, denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent levels, 
respectively.  
 
6.2. Sample Selection Issue 
For robustness, we also address the concern of self-selection issue that may arise since public 
companies self-select whether to engage in RPTs or not. As indicated by prior research, a self-
selection concern could impact the estimation of OLS regressions (e.g. companies that engage in 
RPTs may share similar characteristics relative to companies that do not engage in RPTs), and 
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this, in turn, explains the results (Lawrence et al., 2011). To address the self-selection issue, we 
use the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) approach where each company that reported RPTs is 
matched with another that did not report RPTs, based on a set of observable company’s 
characteristics. In the first stage, a logit regression is used to estimate the propensity scores of 
engaging in RPTs. The logit model is as follows.   
 
(3)ε Year IND                              




] 1 0, [
 
Where the dependent variable (RPTs) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the sum of 
sales, purchases, and the outstanding balance between the company and its related parties 
exceeds 1 per cent of total assets in the firm-year, and zero otherwise, (LNSALES) is the natural 
logarithm of sales that used as a proxy of size, (ASSTURNR) is the ratio of asset turnover, 
computed as sales scaled by total assets, and all other variables are previously defined.  In the 
second stage, we use the predicted value from equation (3) to match each company that reported 
RPTs with another that did not report RPTs that has the closest predicted value. This process 
leads to a matching sample of 238 company-year observations; 119 company-year observations 
that reported RPTs versus 119 company-year observations that did not report RPTs. Then, the 
matched sample is used to estimate the following model.  
 
(4)
ε Year IND   SLGRW β 
CFO β  SIZEβBIG4βGOVSHHLD  βBDIND  β
 BDSIZE β CEOβOWCNβ  LEVβROA  βα RPTs
11
9876








The results of the logit regression on the probability of engaging in RPTs are reported in 
Table 6 (Panel A), while the results on the relationship between RPTs and the financial and 
governance determinants after addressing the selection bias are reported in Panel B of Table 6. 
Overall, the results of Table 6 present consistent evidence that RPTs are positively associated 
with ownership concentration (OWCN) and board size (BDSIZE) and negatively associated with 
board independence (BDIND) and CEO-duality (CEO). This evidence also confirms that the self-
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Table 6 
The association between all determinant variables and RPTs using the PSM approach. 
Panel A: Logit regression on the probability of engaging in related party transactions.  
 
VARIABLES          RPTs = 1  
 Coeff.  t-value   
LNSALES 0.203*** (2.824)  
ASSTURN -0.045 (-1.413)  
LEV 0.019*** (3.064)  
ROA -0.003 (-0.125)  
Constant -2.318* (-1.852)  
Industry dummies  Yes    
Year dummies        Yes   
Log likelihood         -193.85469    
Pseudo R2                0.1294   
Chi squared              57.62   
Mean VIF 1.66   
 
Panel B: The association between all determinant variables and RPTs using the PSM approach. 
VARIABLES             RPTs = 1 
 Coeff.  t-value  
ROA 0.004 (0.133) 
LEV 0.008 (0.738) 
OWCN 0.033*** (3.278) 
CEO -1.380*** (-2.641) 
BDSIZE 0.483*** (3.372) 
BDIND -8.505*** (-2.996) 
GOVSHHLD -2.011 (-0.578) 
BIG4 0.573 (1.097) 
SIZE -0.126 (-0.849) 
CFO -0.022** (-1.988) 
Constant 1.115 (0.394) 
Industry dummies  Yes  
Year dummies        Yes  
Log likelihood         -109.00701  
Pseudo R2                0.2097  
Chi squared              28.77  
Mean VIF 2.48  
N 199  
Notes: This table reports the results on the association between all determinant variables and RPTs, after using the 
PSM approach to address the selection bias concern. Panel A presents the results for Logistic regression on the 
probability of engaging in related party transactions, while Panel B present the results of Logistic regression 
estimates of the determinant variables of RPTs using the PS matching sample. Where the dependent variable (RPTs) 
is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the sum of sales, purchases, and the outstanding balance between the company 
and its related parties exceeds 1 percent of total assets in the company-year, and zero otherwise, (LNSALES) is the 
natural logarithm of sales that used as a proxy of size, (ASSTURNR) is the ratio of asset turnover computed as sales 
scaled by total assets, and all other variables are previously defined in Table 1. ***, ** and *, denote significance at 
the 1, 5, and 10 per cent levels, respectively. Robust t statistics are in parentheses.  
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7. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
This study investigates the impact of a set of determinant factors of RPTs using a sample of 432 
Jordanian company-year observations covering the period of 2011 to 2017. The results of this 
study show evidence that CEO-duality, board independence, and operating cash flows are 
negatively associated with RPTs. On the other hand, financial leverage, ownership concentration, 
board size, and audit quality are positively associated with the occurrence of RPTs. This 
evidence suggests that companies with a higher level of debt and ownership concentration, and 
large boards, which are audited by Big Four audit firms exhibit a higher level of RPTs. On the 
other hand, companies that have CEO-duality, a large number of outside directors on the board, 
and a higher level of operating cash flows exhibit a lower level of RPTs. 
 
Findings of this study related to financial leverage and ownership concentration are 
generally consistent with extant literature that suggests that companies with high debt levels try 
to mask such performance by illegitimately using RPTs, and that companies with high ownership 
concentration might use RPTs in tunnelling activities to expropriate funds to dominant 
shareholders. However, findings related to CEO-duality are generally contrary to extant 
literature, suggesting that the power of dominant shareholders in Jordanian companies will 
undermine that of the CEO, regardless of the CEO being a board chairman or a close relative of 
the chairman or not. As for board size, the findings of this study support findings of some other 
studies that larger board sizes are associated with more involvement in RPTs. This may be 
attributed to the argument that boards in Jordan, whether large or small, may not be sufficiently 
independent, and are ineffective in confronting powerful, dominant shareholders. In addition, 
this study found that the presence of political connections on the companies' boards of directors 
is not associated with RPTs, a finding contrary to many previous studies. A possible explanation 
of this finding is that companies with government ownership (the proxy used for political 
connections in this study) are under more scrutiny, especially given the size and economic 
significance of several of these companies, leading to lowering the level of RPT use. Finally, 
findings of this study report a statistically significant positive relation between using Big Four 
audit firms and engagement in RPTs, a result contrary to much of extant international literature 
from more-developed countries. A possible interpretation of this finding is that the quality of 
auditing in Jordan might not be very different between Big Four and other audit firms, since both 
types of firms are under pressure from dominant shareholders in clients to produce a statutory 
audit where quality is not under high demand (Abdullatif & Al-Khadash, 2010; Abdullatif, 
2016).  In general, the closely-held corporate governance system common in Jordanian 
companies, coupled with weak protection for small shareholders, is expected to lead to 
tunnelling activities by dominant shareholders regardless of the company's profitability, political 
connections, or audit firm type. Indeed, OECD-UASA (2014) reported too much use of RPTs in 
Jordan and other MENA countries, regardless of the type of company or its financial and 
governance characteristics. 
 
The findings of this study present the first evidence in Jordanian literature on 
determinants of RPTs. These findings also contribute in general to RPT literature by shedding 
more light on a set of determinant factors that have not all been sufficiently examined by prior 
research (e.g. ownership concentration and CEO-duality, as both were defined and measured in 
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this study). Further, these findings present practical implications for several interested parties. 
For example, the JSC, in its capacity as regulator and supervisor of public listed companies, 
should expand its regulations to increase the disclosure of RPTs by Jordanian public listed 
companies, and to expand controls and monitoring over RPTs in companies through improving 
corporate governance mechanisms, including increasing the power of smaller shareholders and 
independent board members in approving such transactions (see OECD, 2009). This is because 
even though CEO-duality and political connections did not show in this study an expected effect 
of increasing the level of RPTs, they are to a high extent both a product of ownership 
concentration (CEO-duality through the relation of the CEO with a block owner, and political 
connections through their tendency to be relatively large ownership levels in companies), and 
ownership concentration clearly showed a statistically significant positive relation with the level 
of a company's engagement in RPTs.  In addition, the findings of this study suggest that audit 
firms in Jordan appear to have a limited role in mitigating the occurrence of illegitimate RPTs. 
Therefore, the JSC and other Jordanian regulators have to increase their monitoring of audit 
procedures of Jordanian audit firms relating to auditing RPTs. In summary, corporate governance 
codes and other regulations in Jordan have to be improved and better implemented regarding 
mitigating negative effects of RPTs, and special attention should be given to companies with 
high debt levels and high ownership concentration as to monitoring their RPT activities.  
 
Research on RPTs in developing countries is generally limited in quantity, and there is 
need to replicate this study in other developing country contexts to better assess the RPT issue 
and its potential effects on capital markets and different stakeholders of companies. Due to 
unexpected results related to the effects of political connections, CEO-duality, and audit firm 
quality found by this study, detailed studies of these variables and their possible impact on RPTs 
is encouraged. Other avenues for future research include critical analysis of regulations and 
corporate governance codes related to RPT conduct and disclosure in developing countries and 
how to improve these regulations and codes in order to better monitor companies and protect 
small shareholders and other stakeholders who may be victims of tunnelling conducted by 
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